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The Prehistory of Fair Use* 
Matthew Sag† 
INTRODUCTION  
The fair use doctrine is a central part of modern 
copyright law: academics, critics, journalists, teachers, film 
makers, fan-fiction writers, and technology companies all rely 
on the fair use doctrine to give them a certain amount of 
freedom in dealing with other people’s copyrights. The fair use 
doctrine recognizes that very few works are created without 
some recognizable borrowing from antecedent works. Fair use 
allows copyrighted material to be used without permission; in 
so doing, it sets limits on the otherwise expansive rights of 
copyright owners to control the reproduction and performance 
of their works.1 As part of copyright law’s overall balance 
between authorial incentives and public freedom, the fair use 
doctrine “permits and requires courts to avoid rigid application 
of the copyright statute, when, on occasion, it would stifle the 
very creativity that law is designed to foster.”2 For all its 
acknowledged importance, however, the fair use doctrine is 
difficult—some say impossible—to define.3 This article proposes 
that a full understanding of fair use cannot be achieved 
without appreciating both its origins in English copyright law 
and its development as a legal transplant in the United States.  
Two recent cases illustrate the salience and difficulty of 
fair use. In 2005, Google, Inc. began its massive unauthorized 
digitization of library books to create an unashamedly 
  
 * © 2011 Matthew Sag. All rights reserved. 
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 1 Technically, the fair use doctrine renders certain otherwise infringing 
actions relating to copyrighted works noninfringing. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (“[T]he fair 
use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”).  
 2 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (2005) (internal 
quotation omitted). 
 3 Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433 (2008). 
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commercial book-search engine, Google Books.4 In response to 
criticism and litigation from copyright owners, Google argued 
that its conduct was protected by the fair use doctrine.5 In 
2007, famed children’s book author J.K. Rowling sued to 
prevent the publication of The Harry Potter Lexicon, an 
encyclopedia of fictional facts and observations distilled from 
the seven-volume Harry Potter series.6 The Google Books and 
Harry Potter cases both raise basic questions about the extent 
and duration of copyright-owner control. These questions are 
fundamentally ones of public policy: What is a fair return for 
authors? And when does control over subsequent use harm 
creativity, technological progress, or freedom of expression?  
Copyright owners and defendants alike make claims 
about the history and essential nature of copyright and of fair 
use. The plaintiffs in the Google Books litigation argued that a 
hundred-million-dollar commercial enterprise has never been 
justified—and can never be justified—by a narrow exception 
like fair use.7 The defendants in the Harry Potter Lexicon case 
argued that copyright ownership does not convey—and has 
never conveyed—unlimited rights of control.8  
Claims and inferences about copyright history often play 
a significant role in modern debates about copyright law.9 
Unfortunately, historical discussion of the fair use doctrine in 
the United States tends to proceed from the wrong baseline. 
Specifically, it falls short by over 100 years—treating the first 
American fair use case, Folsom v. Marsh10 (1841), as the 
  
 4 Author’s Guild v. Google, Inc., Civil Action No. 05-CV-8136-JES (S.D.N.Y. 
filed Sept. 20, 2005) (class-action suit); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. Google, Inc., Civil Action 
No. 05-CV-8881-JES (S.D.N.Y. filed June 9, 2006) (a suit on behalf of the Association of 
American University Publishers, the McGraw-Hill Companies, Pearson Education, 
Penguin Group (USA), Simon & Schuster, and John Wiley & Sons). The dispute looks 
set to continue. See Author’s Guild v. Google, Inc., No. 05 Civ. 8136(DC), 2011 WL 
986049 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011) (rejecting proposed class-action settlement). 
 5 Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Defendant Google, Inc. to the First 
Amended Complaint, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings 
8136A, at 9 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2006); see also Matthew Sag, The Google Book 
Settlement and the Fair Use Counterfactual, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 19 (2010). 
 6 Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 7 See Tresa Baldas, Copyright Law Put to Test in Google Case, NAT’L L.J., 
Oct. 3, 2005, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1128416712706. 
 8 Defendant RDR Books’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Warner Bros. Entm’t v. RDR Books, No. 07-9667 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2008). 
 9 See generally Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of 
Piracy, Propertization, and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993 (2006) (summarizing 
and challenging historical claims that copyright has become increasingly “propertized”). 
 10 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
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beginning of the American fair use doctrine.11 As this article 
shows, the fair use doctrine is better understood as the 
continuation of a long line of English fair abridgment cases, 
dating back to the beginning of statutory copyright law in 1710.12 
In evaluating the history of the fair use doctrine, it is a mistake 
to start with Folsom v. Marsh; the complete history begins with 
over a century of copyright litigation in the English courts. This 
is the “prehistory” of the American fair use doctrine.13 
This prehistory consists largely of fair abridgment cases 
litigated in English courts of law and equity between 1710 (the 
year the first copyright act was enacted) and 1841. 
Abridgment—the process of making a shortened version or 
abstract of a longer text—was common in this era, but its 
lawful scope was contested. A review of early English copyright 
cases and other aspects of the historical record leads to two 
significant conclusions. The first is that statutory copyright, 
virtually from its inception, went well beyond merely 
mechanical acts of reproduction. Indeed, by the mid-eighteenth 
century, courts had begun to limit the permissibility of 
abridgments. The second insight is that there is in fact 
substantial continuity between fair abridgment in the 
premodern era and fair use in the United States today.  
This article proceeds as follows: Part I begins with a brief 
summary of the fêted case Folsom v. Marsh and its place in the 
development of American copyright law. Folsom v. Marsh has 
been criticized for expanding copyright protection beyond acts of 
mere mechanical reproduction to include an abstract concept of 
the work’s value. Of course, this critique is premised on the 
belief that the scope of copyright prior to Folsom v. Marsh’s 
intervention was so narrow that it tolerated almost all 
secondary works. Part II exposes the frailty of this premise.  
Specifically, Part II explores the foundation for the 
mechanical conception of premodern copyright and argues that 
  
 11 See infra Part I.  
 12 Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.).  
 13 The prehistory of fair use coincides with premodern copyright, as the 
expression is used by Sherman and Bently. Sherman and Bently draw the distinction 
between modern and premodern copyright, using 1850 as a rough dividing line. For ease 
of reference, this article refers to the period between 1710 and 1841 as the premodern era 
of copyright. The premodern-modern distinction is useful in this context, as the categories 
of intellectual-property law were quite fluid up until the mid-nineteenth century. And 
only after the mid-1800s did the drive to internationalize copyright (a movement that 
culminated in the Berne Convention) significantly influence copyright law. See BRAD 
SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: 
THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760-1911, at 3 (1999). 
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it is incomplete. A rather narrow vision of literary property can 
be gleaned from several sources: the apparently narrow grant 
of rights in the Statute of Anne (the first copyright statute, 
which went into effect in 1710),14 some of the earliest cases 
interpreting the statute, and a number of contemporary 
writings. As Part II also explains, however, a close reading of 
the earliest copyright cases and treatises shows that 
premodern copyright was not consistently limited to mere 
mechanical acts of reproduction. From 1741 to 1841, courts 
distinguished between abridgments of copyrighted works that 
were deemed fair or bona fide, and those that were not. The 
very existence of this distinction expands on the first copyright 
statute’s narrow language.15 This crucial development in 
copyright law predates Folsom v. Marsh by at least 100 years.16  
As Part III establishes in detail, the criteria used to 
evaluate claims of bona fide abridgment in the premodern cases 
are surprisingly similar to the modern fair use doctrine in the 
United States. Like their modern counterparts, judges in 
premodern abridgment cases relied on case-by-case analysis and 
evaluated the amount taken by the defendant in a highly 
contextual fashion. Even more striking is the extent to which 
early cases parallel the modern focus on market effect—namely, 
the market effect of the defendant’s conduct—and on the extent 
to which the defendant’s use is transformative. Although not 
always expressed in these terms, questions of substitution 
effects and the degree of labor and authorial skill injected by the 
defendant permeated the premodern copyright cases.  
Part IV concludes with a reassessment of Folsom v. Marsh 
and its contribution to American copyright law. Understanding 
the prehistory of fair use is useful for understanding fair use in 
the present. The coevolution of copyright and fair use 
demonstrates that fair use need not be a narrow and occasional 
exception to the rights of copyright owners.  
I. FOLSOM V. MARSH AND ITS QUESTIONABLE SIGNIFICANCE 
Folsom v. Marsh concerned two different literary 
treatments of the life of George Washington.17 The plaintiffs in 
this seminal copyright dispute were Folsom, Wells & Thurston, 
  
 14 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (Eng.). 
 15 See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 17 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
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a partnership of publishers that held the rights to Jared Sparks’ 
multivolume collection of The Writings of George Washington.18 
The accused work was Reverend Charles Upham’s The Life of 
Washington, which was mainly comprised of extracts from 
Washington’s own writings.19 Upham’s abbreviated and 
simplified Life of Washington, intended for local school libraries, 
weighed in at a mere 866 pages—light in comparison to Sparks’ 
massive 6763-page compilation.20 About a third of Upham’s work 
consisted of previously unpublished presidential writings, 
presumably copied from Sparks’ compilation.21 
Upham’s publisher, the firm Marsh, Capen & Lyon,22 
argued that even if Folsom held the copyright in Sparks’ twelve-
volume collection of Washington’s writings, the good Reverend’s 
work was nonetheless a fair abridgment that did not infringe.23 
Once Washington’s papers and correspondence were published, 
the publisher contended, anyone had the right to selectively use 
those materials to prepare a new and original work.24  
This defense was entirely plausible given the state of 
the legal authorities at the time. As discussed in more detail in 
the next part, similar abridgments had been allowed by 
numerous English authorities.25 In the 1741 case Gyles v. 
Wilcox, Lord Chancellor Hardwicke explained that a fair 
abridgment should be regarded as a new book and not as a 
trespass on the original that it was derived from.26 Thirty-four 
  
 18 WILLIAM W. STORY, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE 
CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT: 1812-1875, at 100-19 
(1853). The Story Reports of the decision in Folsom v. Marsh contain a summary of the 
master’s report. It is here that we learn that Charles Folsom was the principle plaintiff.  
 19 Id.; see also R. Anthony Reese, The Story of Folsom v. Marsh: 
Distinguishing Between Infringing and Legitimate Uses, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
STORIES 259, 269 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).  
 20 STORY, supra note 18, at 100-19. 
 21 The special master appointed to review the facts concluded that 319 pages 
had been copied, but note that sixty-four of those pages were official documents that 
should not have been subject to any copyright claim. See L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. 
Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 431, 433 (1998). Note also that the 
defendant’s work did not reproduce any original writing by Sparks. Id. Justice Story’s 
conclusion that Folsom somehow held the copyright to the words of President 
Washington after their publication was probably erroneous at the time and would 
certainly be wrong now. Id. at 436. We must suspend disbelief on this point in order to 
comprehend the remainder of Justice Story’s decision. 
 22 Bela Marsh was the main defendant. See supra note 18. 
 23 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
 24 Reese, supra note 19, at 280. 
 25 See infra Part II. 
 26 Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.). See infra notes 102-14 and 
accompanying text.  
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years later, in Strahan v. Newbery, Lord Chancellor Apsley 
found that Newbery’s abridgment of Dr. Hawkesworth’s 
Voyages did not infringe the original. Rather, the lord 
chancellor reasoned, Newberry had created “an allowable and 
meritorious work” by employing his own understanding to 
“retrench[] unnecessary and uninteresting circumstances [that] 
rather deaden the narration.”27 Indeed, Newbery’s revised 
edition preserved the substance of the original but reduced its 
volume by as much as three-quarters.28 Likewise, in the 1761 
case Dodsley v. Kinnersley, an abridgment of a popular novel in 
the modestly titled Grand Magazine of Magazines was also 
found to be noninfringing, principally because the copyright 
owners had already published their own abstract of the book in 
their own periodical.29 
Nonetheless, Justice Story, who decided the case, had 
little sympathy for such arguments. Although he acknowledged 
the English authorities’ holding that “a fair and bona fide 
abridgment of an original work” did not amount to copyright 
piracy, he also relied on those same authorities for a series of 
limiting principles. It was “clear,” in Justice Story’s view, “that 
a mere selection, or different arrangement of parts of the 
original work, so as to bring the work into a smaller compass,” 
did not constitute a fair and bona fide abridgment.30 On the 
contrary, he contended, to qualify as a fair and bona fide 
abridgment, “[t]here must be real, substantial condensation of 
the materials, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed 
thereon; and not merely the facile use of the scissors; or 
  
 27 Strahan v. Newbery, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B.) 913-14. The work in 
question, generally referred to as Hawkesworth’s Voyages, was the first authorized 
account of Captain Cook’s circumnavigation of the globe. The longer title was An 
Account of the Voyages Undertaken by the Order of His Present Majesty, for Making 
Discoveries in the Southern Hemisphere, and Successively Performed by Commodore 
Byron, Captain Wallis, Captain Carteret, and Captain Cook, in the Dolphin, the 
Swallow, and the Endeavour . . . by John Hawkesworth, printed for W. Strahan and T. 
Cadell, 1773. The defendant’s work, Journal of the Resolution’s Voyage on Discovery to 
the Southern Hemisphere, &c. Also a Journal of the Adventure’s Voyage, &c. with an 
Account of the Separation of the Two Ships, and the Most Remarkable Incidents that 
Befel Each, although extolled by the court, was reviewed as “hastily written, and 
hastily printed.” 45 GENTLEMAN’S MAG. 591 (1775); see also Mark Leeming, 
Hawkesworth’s Voyages: The First ‘Australian’ Copyright Litigation, 9 AUSTL. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 159 (2004) (an excellent history of the copyright litigation in relation to 
Hawkesworth’s Voyages). 
 28 Strahan v. Newbery, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 913 (K.B.) 913-14. 
 29 Dodsley v. Kinnersley, (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch.). For further 
discussion of Dodsley, see infra Part III. 
 30 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
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extracts of the essential parts, constituting the chief value of 
the original work.”31 
Deciding in favor of the plaintiff Folsom, Justice Story 
drew a distinction between easy cases of copyright infringement, 
where the defendant’s work is almost exactly the same as the 
plaintiff’s (i.e., cases where “the whole substance of one work has 
been copied from another, with slight omissions and formal 
differences only, which can be treated in no other way than as 
studied evasions”) and hard cases requiring a balance of “the 
comparative use made in one of the materials of the other; the 
nature, extent, and value of the materials thus used.”32 
Illustrating this second category, Justice Story noted that, for 
“the purposes of fair and reasonable criticism,” a review that 
cites “largely from the original work” should be regarded as 
fair.33 By contrast, a review that “cites the most important parts 
of the work, with a view, not to criticise, but to supersede the use 
of the original work, and substitute the review for it” should be 
deemed a “piracy” as a matter of law.34 The distinction here is 
predominantly one of effect: in Story’s view, a new work that 
“supersedes” the original and “substitutes” for it infringed on the 
rights of the copyright owner.35  
What is the significance of Folsom v. Marsh? Justice Story’s 
decision is often celebrated as the origin of the fair use doctrine in 
the United States.36 Indeed, many elements of the decision are 
discernible in the current statutory formulation of the doctrine.37 
However, Folsom v. Marsh has also come to be viewed as a 
significant expansion of the rights of copyright owners.  
In a recent Yale Law Journal article, Professor Oren 
Bracha argues that Folsom v. Marsh was a pivotal component 
of American copyright law’s transformation in the nineteenth 
  
 31 Id. (citing Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489). 
 32 Id. at 344.  
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 344-45. 
 35 Id. Justice Story’s view can be rationalized as follows: if a new work 
incorporates the most important parts of the original, then the risks of such 
impermissible substitution increase. 
 36 Cases crediting the origin of the fair use doctrine to Justice Story include: 
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(comparing the experimental use exemption in patent law to fair use); Rubin v. Boston 
Magazine Co., 645 F.2d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 1981); and Encyclopedia Britannica Educ. Corp. 
v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1167 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). As Kaplan notes, the earliest 
American report that actually uses the expression “fair use” is Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. 
Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136). BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW 
OF COPYRIGHT 67 (1966). 
 37 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1993). 
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century.38 Over the course of the nineteenth century, Bracha 
contends, copyright changed from an exclusive right to make 
verbatim copies of particular texts to an abstract right of 
general control in which the only boundaries of a work were 
identified vis-à-vis its market value.39  
Significantly, Bracha sees Justice Story as a central 
actor in this transformation. Bracha argues that the concept of 
fair use announced in Folsom v. Marsh was a fundamental 
change in copyright’s baseline. In the past, he reasons, 
“infringement was limited to near-verbatim reproduction and 
all other subsequent uses were considered legitimate; in the 
new fair use environment, all subsequent uses became 
presumptively infringing unless found to be fair use.”40 Thus, in 
Bracha’s view, Folsom v. Marsh is both transformative and 
ironic: “[A]lthough the fair use doctrine is commonly celebrated 
today as one of the major safeguards against overexpansion of 
copyright protection[,] at the time it was introduced by Justice 
Story[,] . . . it was a vehicle for a radical enlargement of the 
scope of copyright.”41  
Without doubt, there is something to be said for the 
general story of transformation and expansion that Bracha 
relates. An examination of the early English copyright cases, 
however, casts this transformation in a different light. Notably, 
the disjunctive view of Folsom v. Marsh presumes that the scope 
of copyright prior to Justice Story’s intervention was so limited 
that it tolerated almost all secondary works. But as Part II 
explores, English case law predating Folsom v. Marsh undercuts 
this mechanical conception of premodern copyright. Similarly, 
the substantial continuity between premodern fair abridgment 
cases and the modern fair use doctrine contradicts the notion 
that the fair use doctrine originates with Folsom v. Marsh. 
  
 38 Oren Bracha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets, and 
Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186 (2008). 
 39 Id.; see also BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 1760-1911 (1999) (describing 
the same transition in England). 
 40 Bracha, supra note 38; see also Patterson, supra note 21, at 432 (arguing 
that Justice Story redefined the concept of copyright infringement in Folsom v. Marsh: 
“[I]n his hands became any copying, duplicative or imitative, in whole or in part of the 
copyrighted work. This redefinition of infringement enlarged the copyright monopoly 
and became the basis for what was to become fair use.”). 
 41 Bracha, supra note 38, at 229-30; see also Matthew Sag, God in the 
Machine: A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 414 (2005) (arguing that the existence of the fair use 
doctrine allows the rights of copyright owners to be phrased more expansively than 
would otherwise be possible). 
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II. ABRIDGMENTS, COMPILATIONS, AND OTHER FAIR USES IN 
THE PREMODERN ERA OF COPYRIGHT 
English copyright law in the premodern era offers 
significant insights into the nineteenth-century transition of 
American copyright law. The notion that Folsom v. Marsh 
constituted a radical departure from precedent can be properly 
evaluated only by considering the state of the law before that 
case. With a handful of exceptions, most copyright case law 
predating Folsom v. Marsh was English. In fact, prior to 
Folsom v. Marsh, there were only eleven reported copyright 
decisions in the United States. A review of those decisions 
confirms that the far more developed body of English case law 
was treated as persuasive in mid-nineteenth-century American 
courts. For example, in the Supreme Court’s first copyright 
case in 1834, Wheaton v. Peters, the majority cited eight 
English cases and no American authorities; the dissent cited 
three additional English cases and two American cases.42 
Likewise, in Folsom v. Marsh, Justice Story cited sixteen 
English authorities and not a single U.S. case.43 The use of 
English authority clearly outweighs the nascent American case 
law in almost all reported U.S. cases up to 1841.44 Thus, an 
evaluation of Folsom v. Marsh’s significance in the 
development of American copyright law requires an 
understanding of the development of premodern English 
copyright law.  
The scope of premodern copyright is usually depicted as 
narrow, limited, and mechanical.45 As surveyed in more detail 
  
 42 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591 (1834). 
 43 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
 44 In addition to Wheaton and Folsom, see Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035 
(C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728); Wheaton v. Peters, 29 F. Cas. 862 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1832) 
(No. 17,486); Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2872); Blunt v. 
Patten, 3 F. Cas. 763 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1828) (No. 1580); Ewer v. Coxe, 8 F. Cas. 917 
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1824) (No. 4584); Binns v. Woodruff, 3 F. Cas. 421 (C.C.D. Pa. 1821) (No. 
1424). For the English copyright cases most frequently cited by U.S. courts at this time, 
see Beckford v. Hood, (1798) 101 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B.); Blackwell v. Harper, (1740) 26 
Eng. Rep. 458 (Ch.); Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.); Bramwell v. 
Halcomb, (1836) 40 Eng. Rep. 1110 (Ch.); Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 
(K.B.) 226; Pope v. Curl, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 608 (Ch.); and Tonson v. Collins, (1761) 96 
Eng. Rep. 169 (K.B.).  
 45 See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 19 
(2004) (stating that the historical “distinction between republishing someone’s work on 
the one hand and building upon or transforming that work on the other” has been lost); 
Craig Joyce & L. Ray Patterson, Copyright in 1791: An Essay Concerning the Founders’ 
View of the Copyright Power Granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the 
 
1380 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4 
below, this view finds support in several factors—the text of 
the Statute of Anne itself, the arguments of perpetual 
copyright supporters, the comments of literary luminaries 
(such as Dr. Samuel Johnson), and the outcomes of certain 
prominent early copyright cases—all of which suggest a narrow 
scope of copyright. In particular, the social importance and 
legality of abridgment was frequently asserted.46 Based on this 
narrow vision, Folsom v. Marsh, the first American fair use 
case, looks like a radical departure from both the spirit and 
letter of the law.  
Part II.A begins by exploring the foundations of the 
mechanical view of premodern copyright. As Part II.B 
demonstrates, however, the actual scope of premodern 
copyright was not as narrow as it is often depicted. Indeed, the 
legitimacy of abridgment and other textual borrowing was 
contested both inside and outside the courtroom throughout the 
premodern era.  
A. The Mechanical Conception of Premodern Copyright  
The first place to look for a narrow conception of premodern 
copyright is the text of the Statute of Anne, also known as the 
Copyright Act. The Act begins with the following rationale: 
Whereas printers, booksellers, and other persons have of late 
frequently taken the liberty of printing, reprinting, and publishing, 
or causing to be printed, reprinted, and published, books and other 
writings, without the consent of the authors or proprietors of such 
books and writings, to their very great detriment, and too often to 
the ruin of them and their families . . . .47 
As this preamble indicates, the Act was drafted to address the 
paradigm of rivalrous reprinting of entire works. No thought 
appears to have been given to abridgments, translations, 
compilations, or derivative works. Historians have debated 
whether the Statute of Anne should be seen as displacing, 
regulating, or merely entrenching the cozy monopoly of London 
booksellers in the seventeenth century.48 Regardless of that 
  
U.S. Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909, 915 (2003) (concluding that the copyright 
holder’s rights under the Statute of Anne were limited to printing and vending copies 
of the work).  
 46 See infra note 74 and accompanying text.  
 47 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (Eng.). 
 48 While some authors regard the passage of the Statute of Anne as marking 
a shift from a regime of censorship and trade regulation to one of property rights, 
others see the act primarily in terms of trade regulation. Compare Mark Rose, supra 
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debate, there can be little doubt that the Act’s drafters had one 
particular problem in mind: rivalrous republication of identical 
books.49 By omission or design, the Statute of Anne did not 
address fractional copying or the similarity threshold for works 
based on original works with minor textual differences. Under 
the statute, “the author of any book or books already printed” 
or his assignees, was entitled to “the sole right and liberty of 
printing such book and books for the term of one and twenty 
years.”50 Construed literally, the Act regulated only exact and 
entire reprinting.51  
Subsequent legislative history might also indicate a 
narrow construction of the Statute of Anne. Although the Act 
was enacted in response to sustained lobbying by the London 
bookselling trade, that same group ultimately regarded it as 
unsatisfactory.52 Consequently, a number of London booksellers 
began to lobby for significant changes to the 1710 Act a mere 
twenty years after its enactment.53 In particular, a bill was 
introduced in the House of Commons on March 3, 1737,54 that 
would have made it unlawful to “print, publish, import, or sell 
any abridgement of [a copyrighted work], or any translation 
thereof . . . without the consent of the author or proprietor first 
obtained in writing” within the first three years of the work’s 
publication.55 The fact that booksellers found it necessary to 
make their monopoly over abridgments and translations 
explicit suggests that this right was not perceived as part of the 
  
note 1, at 48, with L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF 
COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USERS’ RIGHTS 27-29 (1991). There is also disagreement as to 
whether the act was primarily drafted in service of the London booksellers, or whether 
it embodied a new social bargain between authors, booksellers, and the reading public. 
Compare JOHN FEATHER, A HISTORY OF BRITISH PUBLISHING 75 (Routledge 1988), with 
RONAN DEAZLEY, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE RIGHT TO COPY: CHARTING THE MOVEMENT OF 
COPYRIGHT LAW IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1695-1775) 46 (2004). 
 49 ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 29 (2010). 
 50 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (Eng.).  
 51 Richard Godson, the author of an early treatise on patent and copyright 
law, notes that consistent with its Saxon origins, the word book may be applied to any 
writing, whether bound or unbound, or consisting of one sheet or many. RICHARD 
GODSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS AND OF 
COPYRIGHT: WITH AN INTRODUCTORY BOOK ON MONOPOLIES 219-20 (1823).  
 52 See DEAZLEY, supra note 48, at 94-96. 
 53 Id.  
 54 Journal of the House of Commons, vol. 22, Mar. 3, 1737, at 769. 
 55 An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 1737, BL 357, c.7. § 41, cl. 22, 
reprinted in PRIMARY SOURCES ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer 
eds., 2008), available at www.copyrighthistory.org. (emphasis added). This article uses 
the modern spelling of abridgment except when quoting directly from original sources.  
1382 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:4 
original grant contained in the Statute of Anne. This 
suggestion becomes even stronger when considering that this 
“new” right was only granted for a period of three years.56  
The first reported case to test the scope of copyright 
under the newly enacted Statute of Anne was Burnett v. 
Chetwood in 1721.57 The plaintiff in this equity proceeding was 
the executor of a deceased author who had written two books in 
Latin.58 The executor sought to enjoin the publication of English 
translations of both books—the unpublished De Statu 
Mortuorum and the published work Archoeologia Philosophica.59  
The defendants denied that translations fell within the 
intended scope of the Statute of Anne.60 Translations, they 
argued, went beyond the merely mechanical art of printing and 
required the investment of the translator’s own skill, style, and 
expression.61 Chancellor Parker leaned toward the view that “a 
translation might not be the same with the reprinting the 
original, on account that the translator has bestowed his care 
and pains upon it, and so not within the prohibition of the 
act.”62 Nonetheless, the court granted an injunction on the more 
  
 56 While some have argued that the terms of royal printing patents before 
and after the Statute of Anne’s enactment bear on its construction, the evidence here is 
inconclusive. Ronan Deazley has recently reviewed a large number of printing patents 
granted in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He notes that although some 
prominent royal licenses specifically included an exclusive right with respect to 
printing abridgments and/or translations, the majority did not. DEAZLEY, supra note 
48, at 94-96 (citing Shef Rogers, The Use of Royal Licences for Printing in England, 
1695-1760, in 1 THE LIBRARY 133, 133-92 (2000)). 
 57 (1721) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.). Thanks to Tomás Gómez-Arostegui for 
alerting me to the fact that, despite common citation to the contrary, this case occurred 
in 1721, not 1720.  
 58 For a detailed discussion of Burnett v. Chetwood, see Stephen A. Siegel, 
Injunctions for Defamation, Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 
655, 684 (2008). 
 59 Id. Although decided in 1721, Burnett v. Chetwood was only reported 
sometime between 1817 and 1819 as a note to Chancellor Eldon’s decision in Southey v. 
Sherwood, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch.) (citing Burnett v. Chetwood, (1817) 35 Eng. 
Rep. 1008 (Ch.)). We know, however, that the outcome of Burnett v. Chetwood was 
known to many in the eighteenth century because it is mentioned in the 1752 case of 
Tonson v. Walker, (1752) 36 Eng. Rep. 1017, 1020 (Ch.) (discussing earlier cases). As 
Siegel notes, reference to unreported cases in the Register’s Book was commonplace in 
the era before official court reporting. Siegel, supra note 58, at 687. But that record 
would not have contained the rationale for enjoining the translating or printing of the 
Archoeologia Philosophica. Id. 
 60 Burnett v. Chetwood, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.). 
 61 Id.  
 62 Id. at 1009. Although this part of the decision is dicta, Robert Maugham, 
the author of what is arguably the first copyright treatise, reports this passage of 
Burnett v. Chetwood as though it were the holding. ROBERT MAUGHAM, TREATISE ON 
THE LAWS OF LITERARY PROPERTY 89 (Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, & Green, 1828). 
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idiosyncratic basis that the “strange notions” contained in the 
original Latin work should not be exposed to the less educated 
who could read them in English.63 The Burnett court’s 
suggestion that a translation should be regarded as a new 
work—rather than a mere reprinting of the original—indicates 
a fairly narrow view of copyright owners’ rights under the 
Statute of Anne. 
The pronouncements of perpetual-copyright supporters 
also lend credence to the notion that premodern copyright was 
envisaged as a limited right regulating the wholesale 
reproduction of books. Advocates of perpetual common-law 
copyright were naturally drawn to stress the narrow scope of 
the right, if only to defend it against their critics. Blackstone, 
for example, was a staunch supporter of an author’s enduring 
right, based on a Lockean conception of natural rights.64 In his 
Commentaries, Blackstone described literary property in terms 
of identity. He argued that 
the identity of a literary composition consists intirely [sic] in the 
sentiment and the language; the same conceptions, clothed in the 
same words, must necessarily be the same composition: and 
whatever method be taken of exhibiting that composition to the ear 
or the eye of another, by recital, by writing, or by printing, in any 
number of copies or at any period of time, it is always the identical 
work of the author which is so exhibited.65 
In Blackstone’s view, the infringement of literary property 
required a level of similarity verging on identity: the “same 
conceptions” in the “same words.”66 Blackstone’s view was 
endorsed by all three of the early copyright treatise authors, 
Robert Maugham, Richard Godson, and Isaac Espinasse.67 This 
narrow conception of copyright would seem to allow ample 
space for partial appropriation and abridgment; indeed, 
  
 63 Burnett v. Chetwood, (1817) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.) 1009. 
 64 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 405-06 
(1766). 
 65 Id.  
 66 Id.  
 67 MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 126; GODSON, supra note 51, at 215; ISAAC 
ESPINASSE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF ACTIONS ON STATUTES, REMEDIAL AS WELL AS 
PENAL, IN GENERAL (1824). Although Godson adopts Blackstone’s language and agrees 
that the transcription “of nearly all the sentiments and language of a book” would 
amount to “a glaring piracy,” he also adds that “[t]o copy part of a work, either by 
taking a few pages verbatim, where the sentiments are not new, or by imitation of the 
principle ideas, although the treatises are in other respects different, is also to be 
illegal.” GODSON, supra note 51, at 215. This statement is actually quite a broad 
formulation of copyright’s reach into partial similarity. 
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evidence indicates that Blackstone himself was amenable to 
this result.68  
The 1769 case Millar v. Taylor provides another 
example of perpetual-copyright advocates’ reliance on a narrow 
construction.69 In that case, a majority of the King’s Bench 
upheld the existence of a common-law copyright (a right that 
that House of Lords eventually overturned in the 1774 case 
Donaldson v. Beckett).70 As part of the Millar majority, Justice 
Aston insisted that 
[although] the right of the copy still remains in the author [the 
public obtains] an unlimited use of every advantage that the 
purchaser can reap from the doctrine and sentiments which the work 
contains. He may improve upon it, imitate it, translate it; oppose its 
sentiments: but he buys no right to publish the identical work.71  
Arguably the best evidence of the conventional premodern 
understanding of copyright scope is the then-prevailing attitude 
toward abridgments. Passages by famous authors, judges, and 
legal commentators extolling the importance and legality of 
abridgment in the premodern era are not difficult to locate. 
Subsequent authors’ liberty to abridge existing works was seen as 
part of the sphere of public use that authors admitted upon a 
work’s publication. The beginning of Godson’s commentary on 
abridgments reflects this understanding: 
Nearly upon the same principles by which it is shewn that there 
cannot be a monopoly of a general subject, it appears that books 
themselves for certain purposes, besides the mere act of reading 
them, may be used by the public . . . . They may be taken as the 
ground work of other literary labours.72  
Abridgment, compilation, and reprinting played an important 
role in the dissemination of scientific, technical, and cultural 
knowledge in the premodern era of copyright. As Ronan 
Deazley summarizes, “periodical publication throughout the 
  
 68 See supra note 27 (discussing Strahan v. Newbery). Blackstone assisted 
Lord Chancellor Apsley in his decision in Strahan v. Newbery, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 913 
(K.B.). According to the case report, the two men spent some hours discussing the 
matter, and they agreed that an abridgment such as Newbery’s was an allowable and 
meritorious new work and not an infringement. Id.  
 69 Millar v. Taylor, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.) 226. 
 70 Id. at 257 (discussing Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.)). 
 71 Id. at 226.  
 72 GODSON, supra note 51, at 238. 
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eighteenth century was an appropriative affair in both 
substance and method.”73 
One of the most famous and forceful advocates of the 
right of abridgment was the author, essayist, and commentator 
Dr. Samuel Johnson. In an article titled Considerations on the 
Case of Dr. Trapp’s Sermons, Abridged by Mr. Cave, Johnson 
emphatically defended the practice of abridgment based on 
three principal grounds.74 Johnson’s first argument addressed 
fairness. Johnson argued that the abridgment was so widely 
practiced and well understood that neither authors nor 
publishers had cause to complain when their works were 
abridged. While Johnson acknowledged that an abridgment 
may do some harm to authors and publishers, he noted that 
this result, even if unstated, was a recognized part of the 
copyright bargain. He thus concluded that “[t]o abridge a book, 
therefore, is no violation of the right of the proprietor, because 
to be subject to the hazard of an abridgement was an original 
condition of the property.”75 
Second, Johnson contended that abridging larger works 
into smaller extracts was vital to educational advancement—a 
theme that resonated with the Statute of Anne’s avowed 
purpose of encouraging learning.76 He reasoned that 
abridgments facilitate the transmission of knowledge “by 
contracting arguments, relations, or descriptions, into a narrow 
compass; conveying instruction in the easiest method, without 
fatiguing the attention, burdening the memory, or impairing 
the health of the student.”77 As an illustration, he noted that 
  
 73 Ronan Deazley, Commentary on Gyles v. Wilcox (1741), in PRIMARY SOURCES 
ON COPYRIGHT (1450-1900) (L. Bently & M. Kretschmer eds., 2008), available at 
http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabecom/%22uk_1741%22.  
 74 Dr. Samuel Johnson, Considerations on the Case of Dr T[rapp]’s Sermons, 
Abridged by Mr. Cave, 1739, 57 GENTLEMAN’S MAG. (1787), reprinted in ARTHUR 
MURPHY, THE WORKS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON 547 (1st ed. 1837). It can hardly be 
overlooked that Samuel Johnson was employed by the very same magazine that had 
abridged Dr. Trapp’s sermons.  
 75 Id.  
 76 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.). The long title of the Statute of 
Anne is An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed 
Books in the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies, During the Times Therein 
Mentioned. Id. 
 77 JOHNSON, supra note 74; see also GODSON, supra note 51, at 238 (noting 
that “[m]any valuable works are so voluminous that abridgments of them are 
extremely useful”). 
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the Transactions of the Royal Society were generally read as 
abridgments, to the great improvement of science.78 
Third, Johnson maintained that established conventions 
in the printing industry confirmed the legality of abridgment. 
Without citing any case law, Johnson confidently declared that 
the practice of abridgment was “an act, in itself legal, and 
justifiable by an uninterrupted series of precedents, from the 
first establishment of printing among us, down to the present 
time.”79 Johnson observed that “numberless abridgements that 
are to be found of all kinds of writing, afford sufficient evidence 
that they were always thought legal, they are printed with the 
names of the abbreviators and publishers without the least 
appearance of clandestine transaction.”80 In Johnson’s view, the 
abridgment of well-known works, such as Clarendon’s History 
of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England, with the apparent 
forbearance of their proprietors was abundant evidence of the 
practice’s legality.81 
Johnson’s defense of abridgment as lawful and socially 
productive is echoed in Robert Maugham’s comments on the 
topic in his Pirating of the Copyright in Printed Books.82 As 
Maugham explains, “An abridgment of a voluminous work, 
executed with skill and labor, in a bona fide manner, is not only 
lawful in itself . . . and exempt from the charge of piracy[,] but 
is protected from invasion by subsequent writers.”83 
The law not only treated abridgments as noninfringing, 
but accorded copyright to abridgments themselves and 
protected them against “invasion by subsequent writers.”84 In 
other words, abridgments were lawfully created new works 
and, in view of their utility and merit, ought to be encouraged.85  
  
 78 For a history of the evolution of the Transactions of the Royal Society, see 
Adrian Johns, Miscellaneous Methods: Authors, Societies and Journals in Early 
Modern England, 33 BRIT. J. HIST. SCI. 159, 159-86 (2000). 
 79 Johnson, supra note 74. 
 80 Id. Later in the same article, Johnson also stated that “there are few books 
of late that are not abridged.” Id. 
 81 Id.  
 82 MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 126. 
 83 Id. Godson illustrates the import of the law with an example: “[O]ne man 
may compose a work, for instance in the Latin language, another abridge it, a third 
translate it, a fourth write annotations upon it; and every one of them will acquire a 
copyright in the product of his own ingenuity and labour.” GODSON, supra note 51, at 
344; see also ESPINASSE, supra note 67, at 78.  
 84 Id.; see also ESPINASSE, supra note 67, at 77-78. 
 85 GODSON, supra note 51, at 238.  
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Consistent with the case law he reports, Maugham’s 
view of abridgment was grounded in a recognition of the skill 
and labor displayed by the abridger.86 He quotes Lord 
Hardwicke in the 1741 case Gyles v. Wilcox: “A real and fair 
abridgment, . . . may with great propriety be called a new book, 
because the invention, learning, and judgment of the author 
are shewn in it, and in many cases abridgments are extremely 
useful.”87 Of course, treatise writers had a strong interest, on 
one hand, in proclaiming their freedom to make abridgments 
and, on the other hand, in protesting their property interest in 
notes and annotations made to preexisting works. It is 
unsurprising, then, that Maugham boldly proclaims the 
legality of both legal and literary compilations, by which he 
means “a collection from various authors into one work.”88 In 
Maugham’s eyes, abridgments had such high social utility that 
they must be given “considerable latitude.”89 He argued that 
“[i]t seems a necessary consequence of the legality of a 
compilation, that the law must also sanction its being done in a 
complete manner, and to effect this object, the quotations must 
generally be both full and numerous.”90 
In sum, several sources—the text of the Statute of Anne, 
the results of early cases (such as Burnet v. Chetwood and 
Strahan v. Newbery), and the writings of Blackstone and 
Johnson—suggest a rather narrow vision of literary property 
under the first copyright act. Support for this view can also be 
found in the early copyright treatises of Maugham, Godson, 
and Espinasse. 
B. A Broader Conception of Premodern Copyright  
Having made the case for a narrow view of premodern 
copyright, it is now time to unmake it. As the remainder of this 
section makes clear, the narrow characterization of premodern 
copyright—as limited to near-verbatim reproduction and 
permissive use of all other subsequent uses of a work—is 
misplaced. Although the scope of copyright in the premodern 
era was undoubtedly narrower than it is today, it did not leave 
abridgment entirely unconstrained. The legality of abridgment 
  
 86 Id. at 129.  
 87 Id. (citing Gyles v. Wilcox, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.)).  
 88 MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 132.  
 89 Id.  
 90 Id.  
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in the premodern period was in fact heavily qualified. 
Furthermore, not all authors agreed with Samuel Johnson on 
its virtues. For example, Daniel Defoe, writing in 1704, decried 
abridgment without the author’s consent as “a certain sort of 
Thieving which is now in full practice in England.”91  
Abridgment was a staple feature of the emerging 
magazine business of the mid-1700s.92 Monthly digests, such as 
Edward Cave’s Gentleman’s Magazine, featured original 
composition as well as extensive extracts from other periodicals 
and books. Cave’s liberal use of abridgment was tested in 
Austen v. Cave. The plaintiffs in Austen—a trio of London 
booksellers named Austen, Gilliver, and Clark—brought an 
action against Cave in the Court of Chancery on August 7, 
1739.93 Cave defended that he was free to publish “short 
extracts, parts of books, pamphlets or other writings newly 
published on various subjects” and that this practice was 
beneficial to the proprietors of such books.94 According to 
Johnson’s account, Cave had copied from only thirty-seven 
individual pages of Dr. Trapp’s original sixty-nine-page book, 
The Nature, Folly, Sin and Danger of Being Righteous over-
Much.95 Furthermore, those thirty-seven pages had been 
reproduced only in part—amounting to a mere thirteen pages 
of the same print in Gentleman’s Magazine.96  
Lord Hardwicke issued a temporary injunction to 
prohibit Cave from printing the book or any part of it until he 
answered the plaintiff’s complaint.97 When the answer came, 
however, the court found it insufficient.98 Although Cave was 
given additional time to resubmit his pleadings, no such 
pleadings were ever entered, and the injunction remained in 
  
 91 DANIEL DEFOE, AN ESSAY ON THE REGULATION OF THE PRESS 25 (Blackwell 
1958) (1704); see also JOHN DUNTON, THE LIFE AND ERRORS OF JOHN DUNTON, CITIZEN 
OF LONDON 52 (1818) (complaining of the prevalence of abridgment by “a whole army of 
Hackney Authors that keep their grinders moving by the travail of their pens”). 
 92 See generally ROBERT D. MAYO, THE ENGLISH NOVEL IN THE MAGAZINES 
1740-1815 (1962) (concluding that epitomes and abridgments were widely employed as 
alternative to wholesale piracy).  
 93 Austen v. Cave, C33/371, f. 493r (Ch. 1739). 
 94 Deazley, supra note 73. 
 95 Compare JOSEPH TRAPP, THE NATURE, FOLLY, SIN, AND DANGER OF BEING 
RIGHTEOUS OVER-MUCH (Austen 1739), available at http://books.google.com/books?id= 
LGU3AAAAMAAJ, with The Nature, Folly, Sin and Danger of Being Righteous Over-
Much, 9 GENTLEMAN’S MAG., June 1739, at 288-92 (on file with author). 
 96 Johnson, supra note 74.  
 97 Austen v. Cave, C33/371, f. 493r (Ch. 1739). 
 98 See ALEXANDER, supra note 49. 
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force.99 Thus, despite Johnson’s insistence that the legality of 
abridgment was justified “by an uninterrupted series of 
precedent,” one of the earliest abridgement cases seems to have 
found that a reproduction of thirteen pages out of an original 
sixty-nine was excessive.100  
Lord Hardwicke’s decision in favor of the plaintiff in 
Austen v. Cave—unreported and unmentioned in early 
copyright treatises—has been understandably overshadowed 
by the lord chancellor’s proabridgment statements in Gyles v. 
Wilcox, decided a mere two years later.101  
Like many early copyright cases, the controversy in 
Gyles centered on an important book of learning, Sir Matthew 
Hale’s Historia Placitorum Coronæ (The History of the Pleas of 
the Crown).102 Although Hale died on Christmas Day 1676, his 
Historia Placitorum Coronæ was not published in an 
authorized form until 1736.103 The defendant, John Wilcox, had 
commissioned an abridgment of the Historia, to be entitled 
Modern Crown Law.104 The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendant’s work “borrowed verbatim from Sir Matthew Hale’s 
Pleas of the Crown”—omitting only statutes that had been 
  
 99 See id. 
 100 But note that four years later, the same publisher successfully answered a 
similar claim of copyright infringement in relation to an abridgment of Memoirs of an 
Unfortunate Young Nobleman that appeared in his magazine. See Cogan v. Cave, 
(1743) Eng. Rep. (Ch.); 13 GENTLEMAN’S MAG., Feb. 1743, at 93-94; id. at 204-05; 13 
GENTLEMAN’S MAG., June 1743, at 305-06. 
 101 Lord Hardwicke’s statements in Gyles are not surprising, as the lord 
chancellor himself dismissed the significance of decisions made on motion where he 
ruled “without much consideration.” See Gyles v. Wilcox, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 
(discussing Read v. Hodges, a 1740 case involving the abridgment of John Motley’s The 
History of the Life of Peter the First Emperor of Russia). Note that the litigation in 
Gyles actually commenced in November 1737, before Austen v. Cave. See Ronan 
Deazley, The Statute of Anne and the Great Abridgement Swindle (working paper 2010) 
(on file with the author). 
 102 Gyles v. Wilcox, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 489; see also Barnardiston, Report of 
Gyles v. Wilcox (London 1741), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/ 
kleioc/0010/exec/ausgabe/%22uk_1741b%22. As reported, the decision is inconsistent as 
to whether the work in question is the more abbreviated Pleas of the Crown or the more 
expansive Historia Placitorum Coronæ, first published in 1736. The court may have 
regarded these two works as merely different versions of the same work. Maugham 
appears to regard it as the latter, but again without differentiation. SIR M. HALE, 
HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONÆ: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN (1736). 
 103 P. R. Glazebrook, Introduction, in 1 SIR MATTHEW HALE, PLEAS OF THE 
CROWN: A METHODICAL SUMMARY 1678, at iii (1971). 
 104 Gyles, 26 Eng. Rep. at 490. The defendant’s work was also referred to in 
the original bill of complaint to the Court of Chancery as A Treatise of Modern Crown 
Law. See Deazley, supra note 101. 
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repealed—and translated “all the Latin and French quotations” 
in Hale’s book into English.105  
The first indication of the Gyles decision’s dual nature is 
revealed by Lord Hardwicke’s approach to interpreting the 
Statute of Anne. As already noted, the 1710 statute was 
expressed in terms easily reconciled with the view that 
copyright was merely “the sole liberty of printing and 
reprinting” works in their entirety.106 The defendant publisher 
urged the court to adopt a similarly narrow reading—arguing 
that the Statute of Anne, as an act of monopoly, should be 
strictly construed.107 The lord chancellor rejected this 
interpretation, saying, 
I am quite of a different opinion, and that it ought to receive a liberal 
construction, for it is very far from being a monopoly, as it is 
intended to secure the property of books in the authors themselves, 
or the purchasers of the copy, as some recompence for their pains 
and labour in such works as may be of use to the learned world.108 
Lord Hardwicke’s purposive reading of the statute led 
him to an equivocal position on the legality of abridgment. 
Distinguishing reprints with minor alterations from “true 
abridgments,” Hardwicke held that, “where books are colorably 
shortened only, they are undoubtedly within the meaning of 
the [Statute of Anne], and are a mere evasion of the statute, 
and cannot be called an abridgment.”109 But the lord chancellor 
also noted that  
this [proposition] must not be carried so far as to restrain persons from 
making a real and fair abridgment, for abridgments may with great 
propriety be called a new book, because not only the paper and print, 
but the invention, learning, and judgment of the author is shewn in 
them, and in many cases are extremely useful, though in some instances 
prejudicial, by mistaking and curtailing the sense of an author.110  
Echoing Samuel Johnson—whose commentary Lord Hardwicke 
had almost undoubtedly read—he cautioned that a rule 
restraining all abridgments would have “mischievous 
consequences, for the books of the learned, Les Journals des 
  
 105 Gyles, 26 Eng. Rep. at 489. 
 106 Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.). 
 107 Gyles, 26 Eng. Rep. 489. 
 108 Id. at 490. 
 109 Id.  
 110 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Scavans, and several others that might be mentioned, would be 
brought within the meaning of this Act of Parliament.”111  
Lord Hardwicke continued the injunction, pending a 
master of the court’s report (assisted by “two Persons skilled in 
the Profession of Law”) on the similarities between the two 
works.112 The result of this court-assisted arbitration proceeding 
was an agreement that the defendant’s work was a fair 
abridgment outside the Statute of Anne’s scope.113 Accordingly, 
the injunction was dissolved.114  
Although Gyles is often cited as the origin of the fair use 
doctrine in England and has generally been received as a 
proabridgment decision, Lord Hardwicke’s reasoning gave as 
much to copyright owners as it took away. On the one hand, 
Gyles confirmed the legality of some abridgments (those 
described as fair).115 Yet it also entrenched a broad purposive 
reading of the Statute of Anne and condemned another set of 
abridgments (those deemed unfair) as infringing copyright.116 
Lord Hardwicke’s purposive reading of the copyright statute 
was also an expansive one.  
Another abridgment case suggests that the eventual 
vindication of the Gyles defendant was far from preordained. In 
the 1801 case Butterworth v. Robinson, Butterworth alleged 
that the defendant’s Abridgment of Cases Argued and 
Determined in the Courts of Law was an impermissible copy of 
the plaintiff’s Term Reports (reports of cases in the courts of 
law).117 The defendant had extracted the same cases as 
Butterworth with certain omissions, such as the arguments of 
counsel.118 The defendant had also restructured the reports—
presenting the material in alphabetical, as opposed to 
  
 111 Les Journals des Scavans was the French equivalent of the Transactions of 
the Royal Society. What is curious about Hardwicke’s comment is that the French 
journal, in any event, would not have been subject to copyright protection in England 
at the time. The Statute of Anne did not “prohibit the importation, vending, or selling 
of any books in Greek, Latin, or any other foreign language printed beyond the 
seas . . . .” Statute of Anne, 8 Ann., c. 19, § 7 (1710) (Eng.). 
 112 Gyles, 26 Eng. Rep. at 419. 
 113 This is made clear in the discussion of Gyles v. Wilcox in Tonson v. Walker, 
(1752) 36 Eng. Rep. 1017 (Ch.).  
 114 Id.  
 115 See ROBERT BURRELL & ALLISON COLEMAN, COPYRIGHT EXCEPTIONS: THE 
DIGITAL IMPACT 255-56 (2005) (arguing that the Statute of Anne was subject to broad 
purposive reading almost from its inception). 
 116 See id. 
 117 Butterworth v. Robinson, (1801) 31 Eng. Rep. 817 (Ch.). 
 118 Id. 
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chronological, order.119 At trial, the plaintiff characterized these 
alterations as an artful arrangement designed to give the 
appearance of a new work.120 Finding the defendant’s 
publication to be “extremely illiberal,” Lord Chancellor 
Loughborough issued an injunction on the plaintiff’s motion, 
with leave for the defendant to answer.121 As far as can be 
determined, the matter was not brought before the court again.  
Austen v. Cave, Butterworth v. Robinson, and even Gyles 
v. Wilcox illustrate that the scope of copyright was not 
consistently limited to merely mechanical acts of reproduction 
in the premodern era. There were in fact numerous instances 
where defendants were enjoined from partial copying and even 
nonliteral copying.122 While the scope of permissible abridgment 
and reuse was broad by modern standards, courts in the 
premodern era did not regard all abridgments as the same; 
rather, they drew a distinction between those that were fair or 
bona fide, and those that were not. Elaborating on the 
threshold of copying that amounts to piracy, Godson notes,  
a variance in form and manner is a variance in substance, and that 
nay material melioration cannot be considered as a piracy; yet a 
piracy is committed whether the author attempt an original work, or 
call his book an abridgment; if the principal parts of a book are 
servilely copied, or unfairly varied.123 
In other words, neither the honest intention to create an 
original work nor merely labeling a work as an abridgment 
were sufficient to elude the author’s copyright in every case. 
Godson continues,  
  
 119 Id.  
 120 Id.  
 121 Id. In his treatise, Maugham takes issue with this decision: “Yet a selection 
of what is material from a large body of Reports, commodiously arranged, whether 
alphabetical or systematic, seems an original work. Indeed the right is undisputed of 
selecting passages from books and reports (including entire judgments) in treatises on 
particular subjects.” MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 132.  
 122 For example, the defendant was enjoined in Austen v. Cave, C33/371, f. 493r 
(Ch. 1739), in Butterworth v. Robinson, (1801) 31 Eng. Rep. 817, and in Wilkins v. Aikin, 
(1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 163. In addition, recent historical research by Tomás Gómez-
Arostegui shows that, although unreported, Tonson v. Baker, C9/371/41 (Ch. 1710), was 
the first lawsuit filed under the Statute of Anne. See H. Tomás Gómez-Arostegui, The 
Untold Story of the First Copyright Suit Under the Statute of Anne in 1710, 25 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1247 (2010). In that case, Tonson was able to secure an ex parte temporary 
restraining order despite his acknowledgment that the defendant’s book was not identical 
to his own; he merely argued that it was the “Same in Substance & Effect.” Id. 
 123 GODSON, supra note 51, at 215-16.  
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A man may fairly adopt part of the work of another; he may so make 
use of another’s labours for the promotion of science, and the benefit 
of the public: but having done so, the question will be—Was the 
matter so taken fairly with that view, and without what may be 
termed the animus furandi [intention to steal]?124 
The requirement that abridgments be “real and fair” as 
opposed to merely “colorably shortened” distinguished between 
abridgments in general and a narrower subset of bona fide 
abridgment. The very existence of this distinction expands 
upon the narrow statutory language of the first copyright act. 
This crucial development in copyright law predates Folsom v. 
Marsh by at least 100 years.125  
III. FOUR CONSTANTS OF FAIR USE 
Abridgment was neither categorically allowed nor 
prohibited in the premodern era of copyright. Instead, the 
legality (or bona fide) of abridgment was usually determined by 
a process not unlike the modern fair use enquiry. Although not 
as systemized, the premodern abridgment cases demonstrate a 
surprising continuity with modern fair use. Like their modern 
counterparts, early abridgment cases treated the question of 
whether a use was bona fide as a complex factual question that 
resists bright-line rules and requires case-by-case analysis.126 
Likewise, the early cases regarded the amount of the defendant’s 
copying as a key, but not decisive, issue.127 Neither of these 
observations is particularly unexpected. What is surprising is 
the extent to which the modern fair use factors of market effect 
and transformative use are present in these eighteenth-century 
and early nineteenth-century decisions.128 As the remainder of 
this article demonstrates, questions of substitution effects and 
the degree of labor and authorial skill injected by the defendant 
were central in premodern copyright cases. 
A. Case-by-Case Analysis 
The modern law of fair use is often assailed for its fact-
intensive, case-by-case, and consequently unpredictable 
  
 124 Id.  
 125 Compare Gyles v. Wilcox, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.), with Folsom v. 
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).  
 126 See infra Part III.A. 
 127 See infra Part III.B. 
 128 See infra Parts III.C-D. 
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nature.129 The U.S. Supreme Court’s admonition in Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose that application of fair use cannot “be simplified 
with bright-line rules, for the statute, like the doctrine it 
recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis” appears to cement 
this aspect of the doctrine.130 For good or ill, in this respect at 
least, not much appears to have changed between 1828 and the 
present. As Robert Maugham concedes, 
It would, perhaps, be unreasonable to expect, that any full and 
precise definition should have been made of the extent to which a 
writer may lawfully quote or extract from the works of his 
predecessors. The courts have generally confined themselves to the 
decision of the mere point in litigation.131  
Similarly, concerning the use of quotations, Maugham observes 
that “[i]t is difficult to define the exact limits to which a 
compiler is confined in his extracts or quotations from original 
authors, or from abridgments or previous compilations. In each 
case the peculiar circumstances attending it must be 
ascertained and considered.”132 Like modern commentators, 
Maugham was quick to point out that this case-by-case 
development gave rise to incomplete, inconsistent, and 
confusing legal doctrines. The dominance of case-by-case 
analysis was not simply a product of the nascent stage of 
doctrinal development. Even in cases where the judges 
regarded the issues as fairly settled, they understood those 
issues as highly fact-specific and resistant to rules of general 
application.133 Premodern abridgment cases and early copyright 
  
 129 Even copyright minimalist Lawrence Lessig disparages fair use on this 
ground, arguing that fair use is so uncertain that it is merely “the right to hire a 
lawyer.” LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004); see also 
Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1090 (2007). 
 130 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). Still, as 
Pamela Samuelson argues, despite the necessity of case-by-case analysis, fair use law 
is probably “more coherent and more predictable than many commentators have 
perceived once one recognizes that fair use cases tend to fall into common patterns.” 
Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2542 (2009).  
 131 MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 126; see also Dodsley v. Kinnersley, (1761) 27 
Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch.) 271 (“No certain line can be drawn, to distinguish a fair 
abridgment; but every case must depend on its own circumstances.”); Wilkins v. Aikin, 
(1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 163 (Ch.) (Fair quotation is “in all cases very difficult to define.”). 
The same sentiment is expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Campbell, 510 U.S. at 
577, and in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
 132 MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 132.  
 133 In the 1761 case Dodsley v. Kinnersley, Sir Thomas Clarke, the master of 
the rolls, noted that “the subject matter of this suit has been so often before the Court 
upon other occasions, that when a case of this kind comes to be litigated, little more is 
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treatises evince the importance of case-by-case analysis in 
determining the bona fides of the defendant.  
B. Amount Copied 
A key element of the modern fair use doctrine is “the 
amount and substantiality of the portion used [by the 
defendant] in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”134 
Not surprisingly, this factor also played a central role in fair 
use decisions from almost the very beginning of modern 
copyright. Consistent with modern doctrine, however, although 
the extent of the defendant’s appropriation was evidently 
pertinent to the ultimate infringement question, courts resisted 
a precise statement on how much copying was too much. The 
cases Dodsley v. Kinnersley in 1761, Roworth v. Wilkes in 1807, 
and Wilkins v. Aikin in 1810 are illustrative. 
Dodsley v. Kinnersley revisited the question of fair 
abridgment in relation to magazines.135 London bookseller Robert 
Dodsley, together with William Strahan and William Johnston, 
had paid Samuel Johnson £75 for the first edition of the two-
volume Rasselas, The Prince of Abyssinia: A Tale.136 Relying on 
the customs of the day, the defendant had reproduced parts of 
the narrative in his Grand Magazine of Magazines. According to 
the case report, the defendant produced evidence that it was 
usual to print extracts of new books in magazines without the 
author’s permission.137 The report also notes that this printing 
was “often done at the request of the author, as being a means to 
help the sale of the book.”138  
Arguing for the opposite conclusion, the plaintiffs noted 
that the defendant had abstracted an excessive amount of the 
  
necessary than to see whether it is adapted to the rules and principles before laid 
down.” 27 Eng. Rep. at 271.  
 134 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006). This inquiry can be traced to Justice Story’s 
original formulation of the fair use doctrine in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). In that case, Justice Story was concerned with protecting the 
“chief value of the original work” against the extraction of its “essential parts” through 
the mere “facile use of scissors” or its intellectual equivalent. Id. at 345.  
 135 (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch.) 271. Ironically, the author of the work 
allegedly copied in Dodsley was none other than Samuel Johnson—the same Samuel 
Johnson whose resounding defense of abridgment is noted supra Part II.A. See supra 
note 74 and accompanying text. 
 136 Nancy A. Mace, What Was Johnson Paid for Rasselas?, 91 MODERN PHILOLOGY 
455, 458 (1994) (clarifying a discrepancy between Boswell’s account and the evidence that 
the booksellers presented at trial to establish their ownership of the copyright). 
 137 Dodsley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270, 270. 
 138 Id. 
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original work and had “print[ed] only the narrative, . . . leaving 
out all the moral and useful reflections.”139 The defendant’s 
reproduction of the Rasselas narrative, the plaintiffs argued, 
“was done in such a way” that it did not “recommend the book, 
but quite the contrary.”140 The plaintiffs relied on depositions 
from three other influential London booksellers, Jacob Tonson, 
Andrew Millar, and John Rivington.141 Unsurprisingly, these 
witnesses unanimously agreed that Grand Magazine had 
extracted such large portions of Rasselas that readers would no 
longer be interested in purchasing the actual book.142 But 
Ambler’s report of the decision notes some ambiguity about 
exactly how much of Johnson’s book had been reprinted.143 The 
report describes the plaintiffs’ witnesses as “conjectur[ing], that 
about two-thirds of the book was printed in the Magazine.”144 As 
the report also notes, however, although this estimate may 
have been true by the time the case was heard, only a small 
amount—“not above one-tenth”—had actually made its way 
into the magazine when the plaintiffs commenced the action.145 
The master of the rolls had little to say on the amount copied 
by the defendant, other than to crisply note that “[i]t does not 
appear that one-tenth part of the first volume has been 
abstracted.”146 The court considered this amount patently 
insufficient to sustain an infringement claim.147  
The 1807 case Roworth v. Wilkes concerned the 
abridgment of a fencing treatise titled The Art of Defence on 
Foot with the Broadsword, a multivolume compendium that 
styled itself as a “universal dictionary of arts and sciences and 
literature.”148 The Encyclopedia Londinensis had quite brazenly 
copied seventy-five pages of the 118-page fencing text in its 
  
 139 Id. at 271. 
 140 Id.  
 141 See Mace, supra note 136, at 457. 
 142 Id.  
 143 Dodsley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270. 
 144 Id. 
 145 The original bill of complaint was filed on May 21, 1759, and the 
defendant’s answer is dated September 12, 1759. It was not until June 15, 1761, 
however, that the case was finally heard. See Mace, supra note 136, at 457. The 
plaintiffs’ witness was a fellow London bookseller, Jacob Tonson, who was also the 
plaintiff in Tonson v. Walker, (1752) 36 Eng. Rep. 1017 (Ch.).  
 146 Dodsley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270.  
 147 Id. Similarly, in Gyles v. Wilcox, the abridgment in question contained 
thirty-five sheets, whereas the original was 275 sheets. This was ultimately held to be 
a fair abridgment. See Tonson, 36 Eng. Rep. 1017 (Ch.) 1020 (discussing Gyles v. 
Wilcox, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.)). 
 148 (1807) 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (K.B.). 
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own volume on the same topic—a practice that was apparently 
not unusual.149 Lord Ellenborough’s brief opinion reduces the 
question of infringement to whether the defendant’s 
publication would serve as a substitute for the original.150 
According to the lord chancellor, the determinative factor in the 
substitution inquiry was whether the later work communicates 
the same knowledge as the original.151 Lord Ellenborough did 
not accept the defendant’s argument that “in a dictionary of all 
arts and sciences the compiler was justified in taking larger 
extracts than in another work of the same description.”152 On 
the contrary, he reasoned, although a compilation such as the 
Encyclopedia Londinensis might differ from a specific treatise 
published by itself, “[T]here must be certain limits fixed to its 
transcripts; it must not be allowed to sweep up all modern 
works . . . or an Encyclopoedia would be a recipe for completely 
breaking down literary property.”153 Lord Ellenborough held in 
favor of the plaintiff on both the text and the drawings.154  
Whereas Dodsley tends to illustrate that copying a mere 
one-tenth of a work was considered too insignificant to sustain 
a charge of copyright piracy, Roworth gives an example of an 
amount of copying—just under two-thirds—considered too 
much. In contrast, the next case considered, Wilkins v. Aikin, 
illustrates a more context-dependent quantitative 
investigation. Wilkins was the author of a single volume 
entitled The Antiquities of Magna Græcia, which he had 
written based on his travels to Sicily and Greece in 1807.155 The 
defendant freely acknowledged quoting sections of Wilkins’s 
book in his own twenty-three-page Essay on the Doric Order of 
Architecture.156 He argued, however, that he had done so in 
accordance with the norms of the Society of Professors of 
Architecture (of which he was a member) and without any 
  
 149 Id. In his discussion of compilations in general, Godson notes that the 
authors of encyclopedias “have generally taken from the works of others with 
unsparing hands.” GODSON, supra note 51, at 233.  
 150 Roworth, 170 Eng. Rep. at 890.  
 151 Id.  
 152 Id.  
 153 Id. He also noted that “[h]ere 75 pages have been transcribed out of 118, 
and that which the plaintiff sold for half-a-guinea may be bought of the defendant for 
eightpence.” Id. at 889-90. 
 154 Id. at 891. The jury found separate damages for the letterpress and the 
prints—£70 for the former and £30 for the latter. Id. at 891. 
 155 Wilkins v. Aikin, (1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 163 (Ch.). 
 156 Id.  
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intention of injuring the plaintiff’s work.157 In Lord Chancellor 
Eldon’s decision, he recognized that the copyright owner’s 
rights extended to both partial and complete reproduction but 
noted that fair quotation must still be allowed. The lord 
chancellor accordingly declared, “There is no doubt, that a man 
cannot under the pretence of quotation, publish either the 
whole or part of another’s work; though he may use, what it is 
in all cases very difficult to define, fair quotation.”158 
Differentiating between fair quotation and its pretense 
required first-hand observation of both the plaintiff’s and the 
defendant’s works. After what appears to have been a fairly 
close review of the two works, the lord chancellor noted that 
the defendant had acknowledged a considerable proportion 
taken from the plaintiff’s work but had also failed to 
acknowledge some.159 Determining whether the defendant had 
crossed the line between fairness and pretense was not a 
strictly arithmetical exercise for the court. 
Analogizing to an earlier case involving a road atlas,160 
the lord chancellor reasoned that publishing an individual map 
to illustrate the history of the maps of a particular region 
would be fair “if it was a fair history of maps of the county,” but 
he cautioned that “if a jury could perceive the object to make a 
profit by publishing the map of another man, that would 
require a different consideration. The slightest circumstances 
therefore in these cases make the most important 
distinction.”161 It seems, then, that the court would have 
countenanced the wholesale replication of a copyrighted map if 
it were merely an illustration of a broader history of map 
making and did not substitute for the original publication of 
the map. Time has somewhat obscured the facts of Wilkins. 
Counsel for the defendant argued that he had, “by no means,” 
extracted “the most valuable or material” aspects of the 
plaintiff’s work and that, in any event, any such abridgment 
and quotation did not exceed three pages.162  
  
 157 Id.  
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 The cases referred to are Carnan v. Bowles, (1786) 29 Eng. Rep. 45 (Ch.); 
Cary v. Faden, (1799) 31 Eng. Rep. 453 (Ch.); and Cary v. Longman, (1801) 102 Eng. 
Rep. 138 (K.B.).  
 161 Wilkins, 34 Eng. Rep. 163. 
 162 Id. But rather than enjoining the defendant’s publication, the court issued 
an injunction permitting the work to be sold subject to the defendant undertaking to 
account according to the result of the action. 
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There is an interesting parallel between this 
nineteenth-century thought experiment and recent 
controversial cases, such as Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling 
Kindersley Ltd.163 In Bill Graham Archives, the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the use of historic 
concert promotional posters for the Grateful Dead in a rock 
biography was “a purpose separate and distinct from the 
original artistic and promotional purpose for which the images 
were created”; thus, even total copying did not necessarily 
weigh against fair use.164 Likewise, in two contemporary cases 
involving visual search engines, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc.165 and Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,166 the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit held that reproducing images on a smaller 
scale as part of a visual search engine was fair use.167 In 
reaching this decision, the court reasoned that using these 
works as pointing devices did not substitute for the expressive 
value of the authors’ original expression.168 
Godson’s treatise indicates another way that the 
amount of the defendant’s copying was understood 
contextually. Godson notes that if  
the work complained of is in substance a copy, then it is not 
necessary to shew the intention to pirate; for the greater part of the 
matter of the book having been purloined, the intention is apparent, 
and other proof is superfluous. A piracy has undoubtedly been 
committed. But if only a small portion of the work is quoted, then it 
becomes necessary to prove that it was done animo furandi 
[intention to steal]; with the intention of depriving the author of his 
just reward, by giving his work to the public in cheaper form.169  
Godson suggests here that intent to pirate can be presumed 
from a significant amount of copying and that, where less is 
copied, the defendant’s intent must be investigated more 
thoroughly. It is also noteworthy that the animo furandi (or 
intention to steal) Godson identifies is not an intention to free 
  
 163 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609-10 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
 164 Id. at 613.  
 165 487 F.3d 701, 721 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d in part on reh’g, 508 F.3d 1146 (9th 
Cir. 2007).  
 166 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 167 Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 721; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 822. For a detailed 
discussion of Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., and Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp. as 
illustrations of the interaction between copyright law and copy-reliant technology, see 
Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1607 (2009). 
 168 See supra note 167. 
 169 GODSON, supra note 51, at 216-17. 
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ride—which Godson does not condemn—but rather the 
intention to interfere with the author’s market-based rewards.  
On first impression, we could infer from Dodsley and 
Roworth that an abstraction of a mere one-tenth of a larger 
work was considered too little to amount to infringement170 and 
that an appropriation of two-thirds was too much to escape the 
charge of piracy.171 But like their modern counterparts, these 
cases should not be read as setting any immutable numerical 
thresholds. While it is clear that the extent of the defendant’s 
appropriation was an important consideration in copyright 
cases of this era, it is also apparent from Wilkins v. Aikin that 
the amount of tolerable copying varied according to both the 
purpose of the defendant’s use and that use’s effect on the 
copyright owner.172 This observation leads naturally into the 
next consideration: market effect. 
C. Market Effect 
Courts in the United States are required by statute to 
consider “the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work” in any fair use determination.173 
Judges and commentators enlightened by the law-and-
economics movement are naturally drawn to describe the fair 
use doctrine in the language of economics.174 As Judge Posner 
explains in Ty, Inc. v. Publications International,175 the 
difference between fair use and infringement can often be 
reduced to the difference between complementary and 
  
 170 Dodsley v. Kinnersley, (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch.). 
 171 Roworth v. Wilkes, (1807) 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (K.B.). For another case of 
excessive copying, see Macklin v. Richardson, (1770) 27 Eng. Rep. 451 (Ch.).  
 172 As Lord Chancellor Cottenham noted in Bramwell v. Halcomb,  
When it comes to a question of quantity, it must be very vague. One writer 
might take all the vital part of another’s book, though it might be but a small 
proportion of the book in quantity. It is not only quantity but value that is 
always looked to. It is useless to refer to any particular cases as to quantity. 
Bramwell v. Halcomb, (1836) 40 Eng. Rep. 1110 (Ch.) 1112. For a summary of the 
modern fair use doctrine on this point, see Sag, supra note 167. 
 173 17 U.S.C. § 107(41) (2006). 
 174 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and 
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 
(1982); William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An 
Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2000). Judge Posner notes that “economic 
terminology . . . has become orthodox in fair-use case law.” Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, 
Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 517 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 175 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002). 
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substitutive use.176 For example, a parody does not substitute 
for its target;177 a political attack advertisement does not 
substitute for a televised debate;178 and a search engine is no 
substitute for the websites it indexes.179 While this focus on 
market substitution is unremarkable in the modern context, it 
is more surprising to find it so pervasively ingrained in the 
discourse of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century 
copyright cases. Writing in 1828, Maugham commented, 
“According to some authorities, . . . [bona fide extracts] must 
not be so extensive as to injure the sale of the original work, 
even though made with no intention to invade the previous 
author. . . .”180 In another passage, Maugham explains,  
Yet reasonable bounds must be set to the extent of transcripts. If an 
article in a general compilation of literature and science copies so 
much of a book, the copyright of which is vested in another person, 
as to serve as a substitute for it, though there may have been no 
intention to pirate it, or injure its sale,—this is a violation of literary 
property for which an action will lie to recover damages.181 
Understanding exactly what Maugham meant by “substitute” 
and the term’s broader significance in differentiating bona fide 
abridgments from infringing ones requires some unpacking. 
Both passages stress that the absence of intention to invade 
the copyright owner’s rights was not considered dispositive; the 
key concern was apparently substitution as determined 
through market displacement. Although Godson adopts more 
intention-based language, he also describes an unfair 
abridgment as “depriving the author of his just [market-based] 
reward, by giving his work to the public in a cheaper form.”182  
  
 176 Id. at 517. 
 177 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 178 See, e.g., Edward Lee, Warming up to User-Generated Content, U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1459, 1529 (2008) (discussing a television network’s demands that two 
presidential candidates remove copyrighted footage of a presidential debate from their 
campaign videos and the prospects of a fair use defense); see also MasterCard Int’l, Inc. 
v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6068 (GBD), 2004 WL 434404 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004). 
 179 See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 180 MAUGHAM, supra note 62. 
 181 Id. at 132-33 (emphasis added); see also GODSON, supra note 51, at 247 
(noting that “no one is allowed, under the pretence of quoting, to publish either the 
whole or the principle part of another man’s composition; and therefore a review must 
not serve as a substitute for the book reviewed”) (citations omitted).  
 182 GODSON supra note 51, at 216-17. 
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Maugham’s treatise contains a revealing section on the 
relevance of injury to the copyright owner.183 He begins by 
observing the existence of some confusion: 
The grounds of the decisions on this important subject, as reported 
in the law books, are not altogether consistent in principle. In some 
of them, it appears that the piracy occasioning, or obviously tending 
to, a depreciation in the value of the original work, is a fact on which 
much reliance has been placed in determining the question. In 
others, this circumstance has been altogether disregarded.184  
Other passages in Maugham’s treatise make it clear that what 
he means by “depreciation in value” is an injury to the sales of 
the original work. Making the point differently, Maugham 
notes that, in some cases, a bona fide abridgment is considered 
a new work and thus allowed even if it injures sales of the 
original: “On the one hand it has been held, that a fair and 
bona fide abridgment of any book, is considered a new work; 
and however it may injure the sale of the original, yet it is not 
deemed a piracy or violation of the author’s copyright.”185 
Maugham cites Gyles v. Wilcox for this proposition.186 In the 
relevant paragraph of Gyles, Lord Hardwicke made his famous 
statement that a “real and fair abridgment” should not be 
restrained by copyright.187 In the same passage, Hardwicke 
equated a fair abridgment with new works of authorship 
because “the invention, learning, and judgment of the author is 
shewn in them.”188 Notably, Hardwicke acknowledged that even 
a fair abridgment may injure the textual integrity of the 
original author’s work: it may be “prejudicial” to the author “by 
mistaking and curtailing the sense of the author.”189  
Wilkins v. Aikin also held that a fair and bona fide 
abridgment was noninfringing, despite prejudice to the 
copyright holder.190 As discussed previously, this case concerned 
a claim of infringement by William Wilkins in his book The 
Antiquities of Magna Græcia against Aikin’s An Essay on the 
Doric Order of Architecture.191 While the facts of Wilkins have 
  
 183 MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 126. 
 184 Id. at 130. 
 185 Id.  
 186 Id.  
 187 Gyles v. Wilcox, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch); see also supra note 87 and 
accompanying text. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Wilkins v. Aikin, (1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 163 (Ch.).  
 191 See supra text accompanying notes 155-62. 
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already been related, it is interesting to reflect on Lord 
Chancellor Eldon’s chain of reasoning in this case. His lordship 
began with the legitimacy of defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s 
publication: “The question upon the whole is, whether this is a 
legitimate use of the Plaintiff’s publication in the fair exercise 
of a mental operation, deserving the character of an original 
work.” The lord chancellor saw the question of legitimacy and 
“the fair exercise of mental operation” as equivalent; if the use 
is deemed legitimate—presumably because of the intellectual 
labor added by the defendant—the work is regarded as a new 
work, not an infringing one. The exculpatory effect of the “fair 
exercise of mental operation” was not contingent on a lack of 
harm to the original copyright holder. Quite the contrary, Lord 
Chancellor Eldon explained: “The effect, I have no doubt, is 
prejudicial[;] it does not follow, that therefore there is a breach 
of the legal right.”192 
In contrast to Gyles v. Wilcox, Maugham notes that, in 
Roworth v. Wilkes (the case of the Encyclopedia Londinensis), 
the court held for the plaintiff precisely because of the risk that 
the encyclopedia entry on fencing would displace the plaintiff’s 
more expensive treatise on the subject.193 The key determinant 
of infringement, according to Lord Ellenborough, was whether 
the defendant’s publication was “in substance a copy” and 
would thus serve as a substitute for the plaintiff’s.194 In this 
sense, Lord Ellenborough appears to have assessed 
substitution at a functional level: his lordship was concerned 
with whether “so much be extracted that it communicates the 
same knowledge with the original work.”195 As noted above, 
Lord Ellenborough held in favor of the plaintiff on both the text 
and the drawings.196 
Maugham resolves the apparent tension between cases 
that take account of injury to the plaintiff and those that do not 
by observing “a clear distinction in the nature of these two 
  
 192 Wilkins, 34 Eng. Rep. at 165. Lord Chancellor Eldon continued the interim 
injunction and directed that an action be brought immediately. Wilkins, 34 Eng. Rep. 163. 
But no action appears to have been brought. See ALEXANDER, supra note 49, at 184. 
 193 Roworth v. Wilkes, (1807) 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (K.B.). See MAUGHAM, supra 
note 62, at 130 (“On the other hand, in the case of the Encyclopedia Londinensis, in which 
a large part of a treatise on fencing was transcribed, though there might have been no 
intention to injure its sale, yet as it might serve as a substitute for the original work, and 
was sold at a much lower price, it was held actionable, and damages were recovered.”). 
 194 Roworth v. Wilkes, (1807) 170 Eng. Rep. 889 (K.B.). 
 195 Id. 
 196 Id. 
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cases, although the fact of depreciation might be in each the 
same.”197 In Maugham’s view, cases strongly influenced by the 
prejudice to the copyright owner were distinguishable from 
those that were not because the latter involved the defendant’s 
application of labor and judgment, whereas the former were 
merely instances of “wholesale compilation.”198 Maugham sees 
Rowoth, for example, as a case “in which seventy-five pages 
were successively transcribed, without addition or alteration, 
and on which consequently no skill or learning had been 
bestowed.”199 He concludes that “the exercise of [skill or 
learning] may be considered . . . the true criterion by which to 
determine the bona fide character of the abridgment or 
compilation.”200 Modern fair use case law makes a similar 
distinction between different kinds of market effect.201  
Despite the continuity and congruity between the 
premodern and contemporary understanding of market effect, 
the parallels should not be overstated. The premodern 
abridgment cases clearly part company with their modern 
counterparts in their narrow conception of derivative rights. 
Under modern copyright law, the author’s exclusive rights 
include the right “to prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work.”202 The modern copyright statute defines 
derivatives broadly as “a work based upon one or more 
preexisting works,” and the statutory definition also expressly 
includes abridgments and translations.203 But case law indicates 
that a work is not derivative unless it has substantially copied 
from a prior work.204  
  
 197 MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 130. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id.  
 200 Id.  
 201 For example, in Campbell, the Supreme Court explained that 
when a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills demand for the 
original, it does not produce a harm cognizable under the Copyright Act. 
Because parody may quite legitimately aim at garroting the original, 
destroying it commercially as well as artistically, the role of the courts is to 
distinguish between biting criticism that merely suppresses demand and 
copyright infringement, which usurps it. 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591-92 (1994) (quoting Fisher v. 
Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986); KAPLAN, supra note 36, at 69) (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted). 
 202 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006). 
 203 Id. § 101 (defining “derivative work”).  
 204 Caffey v. Cook, 409 F. Supp. 2d 484, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); 1-3 DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.01 (2010). See generally Naomi Abe Voegtli, 
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Dodsley v. Kinnersley illustrates the narrow conception 
of the copyright owner’s rights regarding derivative works—the 
prevailing view in the premodern era. In Dodsley, the plaintiffs 
argued that Grand Magazine’s publication of Samuel Johnson’s 
novel Rasselas was particularly harmful because “it was done 
in such a way, as not to recommend the book, but quite the 
contrary; by printing only the narrative, and leaving out all the 
moral and useful reflections.”205 In this plea to protect both their 
literary and commercial interests, the plaintiffs portrayed the 
abridgment in Grand Magazine as an inferior version of the 
original work, bleached of intellectualism and literary merit.206 
But the master of the rolls, Sir Thomas Clarke, was not 
sympathetic to arguments based on either literary or 
commercial integrity. He dismissed the notion that the 
abridgment could harm the work’s reputation, stating that “it 
tends to the advantage of the author, if the composition is good; 
if it is not, it cannot be libeled.”207 
The Dodsley court also appeared to accept the 
defendant’s argument that the abridgment of books in 
magazines actually inured to the benefit of copyright owners as 
a form of free advertising.208 The master of the rolls noted that 
“[t]he nature of annual registers, magazines, [etc.], is to give an 
abstract or analysis of authors” and that the plaintiffs 
themselves had benefited from this freedom in the past in 
relation to their own periodicals.209 
The master warned that to find a subsequent 
abridgment infringing would require holding—at great 
prejudice to the plaintiffs—that every abridgment was an 
infringement.210 The Dodsley decision in favor of the defendant 
  
Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213 (1997) (reviewing the history of 
the derivative right in the United States). 
 205 Dodsley v. Kinnersley, (1761) 27 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch.).  
 206 On the defendant’s side, it could be argued that they had merely 
“retrenched the unnecessary and uninteresting” parts of the text “which rather deaden 
the narration.” This was Apsley’s conclusion in Strahan v. Newbery, (1775) 98 Eng. 
Rep. 913 (Ch.).  
 207 Dodsley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270; see also GODSON, supra note 51, at 238 (“In 
general, an abridgment tends to the advantage of the author, if the composition be 
good; and may serve the end of an advertisement. The inquiry whether the work is 
prejudiced by the manner of making the abridgment cannot be entertained.”). 
 208 Dodsley, 27 Eng. Rep. 270. 
 209 The court did not regard these trade customs as binding, but it noted that 
it ought to “take notice of the springs flowing from trade” and consider their 
consequences. Id.  
 210 Id. The exact words of the master of the rolls were  
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was not, however, based on a broadly construed right of 
abridgment and reuse. Instead, the primary ground for the 
decision was the lack of market prejudice. According to the 
master, the plaintiffs suffered no prejudice because they had 
already published an abstract of the book in their own 
periodical, the London Chronicle.211 Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ 
bill was dismissed.212 Implicit in the master’s conclusion is an 
understanding that unauthorized abridgments are only 
impermissible to the extent that they substitute for the 
copyright owner’s original work. What is missing here, from a 
modern perspective, is any consideration of how an unlicensed 
abridgment may substitute for the plaintiff’s own derivative 
work. Unauthorized derivative works were enjoined from time 
to time in the premodern era, but seemingly only when they 
directly competed with the copyright owner’s original work. 
There is no evidence in these early cases that courts considered 
prohibiting unlicensed derivatives on the theory that they 
would compete with the plaintiff’s own derivative.  
The premodern copyright cases touching on market 
effect are thus both familiar and strange. The essential factor—
the effect of the defendant’s copying on the plaintiff’s market—
is familiar to the modern copyright scholar, but the decidedly 
narrow conception of that market is less so.213  
D. Transformative Use 
In modern fair use jurisprudence, a use may be 
considered transformative if it incorporates an existing work in 
a way that adds something new—by casting a critical eye on 
the original, by incorporating the original into an entirely 
different sort of work, or by processing the original as an 
intermediate step in the production of a noninfringing end 
product (such as the automated copying of websites to 
  
[w]hat I materially rely upon is, that it could not tend to prejudice the 
plaintiffs, when they had before published an abstract of the work in the 
London Chronicle. If I was to determine this to be elusory, I must hold every 
abridgment to be so; and that, from its extensive consequence, would 
prejudice the plaintiffs. 
Id.  
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 A similar shift on market conception is evident in trademark law. See 
generally Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2007). 
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construct a search-engine index).214 If the early copyright cases 
and treatises reviewed in this article are any guide, these 
transformative uses would have also been regarded as 
noninfringing in the premodern era—but perhaps for slightly 
different reasons.  
The essence of the premodern cases is synthesized by 
Maugham’s assessment that the application of skill or labor 
should “be considered as the true criterion by which to 
determine the bona fide character of the abridgment or 
compilation.”215 There is an essential difference between fair use 
in the premodern cases and the approach that has emerged in 
the United States since the Supreme Court’s Campbell 
decision. The latter focuses on the legitimacy of appropriative 
uses that result in transformative output, whereas the early 
copyright cases focus more on inputs. Nonetheless, the distance 
between the modern approach and the views of the early 
English copyright courts may be narrower than an input-
output dichotomy suggests.  
There are other passages in Maugham’s treatise that 
can be read as equivalent to the modern parsing of the 
transformative-use concept. For example, Maugham says,  
Where labor, judgment, and learning, however, have been applied in 
adapting existing works into a new method, and the composition has 
been evidently made with a fair and honest intention to produce a 
new and improved work, it seems that the law will justify the 
publication, although the abridgment or compilation should injure 
the sale of the former works.216 
It seems unlikely that a composition “evidently made with a 
fair and honest intention to produce a new and improved work” 
could fail to satisfy the Supreme Court’s standard of adding 
“something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”217  
The early copyright cases stressed the importance of the 
defendant’s labor and the link between the newness of an 
abridgment and its social utility. As already noted, in Gyles v 
Wilcox, Lord Hardwicke explained that a “real and fair 
abridgment . . . may with great propriety be called a new book, 
because . . . the invention, learning, and judgment of the author 
  
 214 This is not intended as an exhaustive statement of the boundaries of 
transformative use.  
 215 MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 130.  
 216 Id. at 126. 
 217 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).  
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[are] shewn in it, and in many cases abridgments are extremely 
useful.”218 In addition, there are indications that the exculpatory 
labor the courts were seeking in order to find fair abridgment 
was authorial in nature and not merely industrious. Godson, 
for example, argued that a “real and fair abridgment” must not 
be merely colorably shortened (i.e., by omitting some parts and 
merely transposing others) and that “[t]here must, at least, be 
invention, learning, and judgment shewn by the author of [the 
abridgment].”219 The application of invention, learning, and 
judgment sounds more like authorship than mere industry and 
mechanical application. This point is illustrated in the 1775 
case Strahan v. Newbery, which explicitly recognized 
abridgment as an act of “understanding.”220 We cannot dismiss 
the possibility that the court’s primary impetus for allowing the 
abridgment was the desire to see an account of Dr. 
Hawkesworth’s Voyages made more broadly available. But it is 
significant nonetheless that the court at least claimed to have 
considered the defendant’s editorial contribution and that it 
chose to frame its decision in those terms. According to the 
report, both Lord Chancellor Apsley and Justice Blackstone 
agreed that “an abridgment, where the understanding is 
employed . . . is not an act of plagiarism upon the original work, 
nor against any property of the author in it, but an allowable 
and meritorious work.”221  
In 1810, Wilkins v. Aikin framed the issues similarly. In 
determining whether the defendant’s Essay on the Doric Order of 
Architecture had impermissibly copied the plaintiff’s Antiquities of 
Magna Græcia, the court delineated the question in terms of the 
defendant’s mental and authorial contribution: “[W]hether this is 
a legitimate use of the plaintiff’s publication in the fair exercise of 
a mental operation, deserving the character of an original work.”222 
Admittedly, in both of these cases, it is hard to be sure whether 
the identification of mental labor producing a “new” work should 
be treated as an instrumental finding or merely as a restatement 
of the court’s conclusion.223  
  
 218 Gyles v. Wilcox, (1741) 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch.) 490 (emphasis added); see 
also MAUGHAM, supra note 62, at 129.  
 219 GODSON, supra note 51, at 230. 
 220 Strahan v. Newbery, (1775) 98 Eng. Rep. 913 (Ch.).  
 221 Id. 
 222 Wilkins v. Aikin, (1810) 34 Eng. Rep. 163 (Ch.) 165. 
 223 This problem applies with equal force to modern fair use cases. See Sag, 
supra note 41. 
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The importance of the defendant’s addition of authorial 
value is perhaps most apparent in Burnett v. Chetwood.224 In 
this 1721 case, counsel for the defendant argued that  
the translator may be said to be the author, in as much as some skill 
in language is requisite thereto, and not barely a mechanic art, as in 
the case of reprinting in the same language; that the translator 
dresses it up and clothes the sense in his own style and 
expressions . . . and therefore should rather seem to be within the 
encouragement than the prohibition of the act.225 
The defendant in Burnett clearly rested his noninfringement 
claim on a claim to equal status as an author. The lord 
chancellor agreed, noting that “a translation might not be the 
same with the reprinting the original, on account that the 
translator has bestowed his care and pains upon it, and so not 
within the prohibition of the act.”226  
CONCLUSION 
Some periods of copyright history are better known than 
others. The dismantling of the Stationer Guild’s printing 
monopoly at the end of the seventeenth century, the beginning 
of statutory copyright with the Statute of Anne in 1710, and 
the death knell of perpetual common-law copyright in 1774 
after Donaldson v. Becket are each deservedly well studied.227 
The latter two events are particularly well rehearsed in 
American copyright lore. But most American scholarship, after 
having addressed the topics that the Founders may have 
contemplated in the late 1770s as they drafted the U.S. 
Constitution and the new nation’s first copyright act, proceeds 
directly to twentieth-century technological and social 
developments.228 Even those U.S. scholars who do take a 
backward glance at the nineteenth century tend to do so from a 
strictly American point of view.229 Consequently, the 
  
 224 (1721) 35 Eng. Rep. 1008 (Ch.). 
 225 Id. at 1009. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Classic works encompassing these events include KAPLAN, supra note 36; 
L. RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1968); HARRY H. RANSOM, 
THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE (1956); and MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE 
INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT (1993).  
 228 See, e.g., Joyce & Patterson, supra note 45. 
 229 An important exception is WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE (2009). 
For a rare comparative survey, see Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: 
Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990).  
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development of English copyright law from 1774 to the mid-
nineteenth century has been largely neglected in this country.  
By examining the prehistory of fair use, this article 
sheds light on the origins of the fair use doctrine in the United 
States. The complete history of the fair use doctrine begins 
with over a century of copyright litigation in the English 
courts. This broader view of copyright history shows that 
Justice Story’s 1841 decision in Folsom v. Marsh was not the 
origin of the fair use doctrine. As Part II explains, a review of 
the prehistory of fair use also shows that contemporary 
copyright skeptics may have overstated the narrowness of 
premodern copyright.  
More significantly, the study of this prehistory 
demonstrates the gradual coevolution of copyright and fair use. 
Plaintiffs in copyright lawsuits are quick to characterize the 
fair use doctrine as a narrow exception that should be 
cautiously applied.230 In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 
Justice Blackmun characterized the fair use doctrine as “a form 
of subsidy” at the expense of authors that permits limited use 
of a work “for the public good.”231 A number of scholars have 
embraced this conception. Jane Ginsburg, for example, has 
emphasized the function of fair use as the “redistribution” of 
value from copyright owners to preferred classes of users.232 
This view of fair use sees copyright as the presumptive right of 
authors and the exceptions to that right as things to be either 
confined to the truly deserving or eliminated altogether. But 
the suggestion that fair use should be seen as the exception to 
the norm of total copyright owner control is historically 
unfounded. As the prehistory of fair use makes plain, copyright 
owners’ rights have been subject to and defined by the public’s 
fair use rights since the beginnings of statutory copyright.  
  
 230 See, e.g., Notice of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction, Warner Bros. 
Entm’t v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 07 Civ. 9667 (RPP)), 
2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions 79667. 
 231 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 477-78 (1984) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 232 Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 1, 15 (1997) (emphasizing the “redistribution” of value from copyright owners to 
preferred classes of users); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui 
Generis Protection of Databases in the United States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 
151, 169 (1997) (viewing fair use as a subsidy from copyright owner in favor of uses 
with public benefits); see also Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights 
and Contract in the “Newtonian” World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
115, 134-35 (1997). 
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Cumulatively, the cases reviewed in this article 
demonstrate the gradual, if haphazard, development of the 
body of law we have come to understand as fair use. Part III of 
this article explored the substantial continuity between the fair 
abridgment decisions of the premodern era and the fair use 
doctrine in the United States today. Just as it does now, the 
problem of fair use presented difficult line-drawing questions 
in copyright’s premodern era. What is illuminating for the 
modern copyright scholar is not so much where these lines 
were drawn in specific cases, but rather the analytical tools 
used to draw them. As Part III establishes, the criteria used to 
evaluate claims of fair use in the premodern cases 
demonstrates a surprising level of continuity with the modern 
fair use doctrine. The key inquiries in fair abridgment cases in 
the premodern era are quite similar to the fair use factors 
enshrined in the Copyright Act of 1976. Nevertheless, although 
the general questions that courts ask in fair use cases have 
remained largely constant over the years, the answers have 
changed markedly. No court today would entertain the notion 
that an abridgment that includes no critical commentary and 
merely retells the original work’s story is anything other than 
an infringement.  
Focusing on the continuity between fair use in the 
premodern era and the doctrine today assists in reframing the 
true significance of Folsom v. Marsh. As discussed in Part III, 
analysis of substitution and market effects was a staple feature 
of abridgment cases in the premodern era. Yet premodern 
courts’ understanding of the relevant market’s constitution was 
quite narrow by modern standards, even if they were sensitive 
to market effects. As the contrast between Roworth v. Wilkes 
and Dodsley v. Kinnersley illustrates, a copyright owner’s 
petition to enjoin an unauthorized abridgment was likely to be 
well received if the abridgment in question threatened to 
substitute directly for the copyright owner’s original work.233 
Still, courts did not accept that a copyright owner was harmed 
by an abridgment that merely competed with his own 
derivative work.  
The premodern cases illustrate a half-formed notion of 
the derivative right: unauthorized derivatives could be enjoined 
to defend the market of the original work, but they did not 
constitute a separate market unto themselves. This observation 
  
 233 See supra Part III.B. 
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brings the contribution of Justice Story’s 1841 decision in 
Folsom v. Marsh into sharper focus. Folsom departs from the 
earlier English cases in that it recognizes derivatives as 
inherently valuable—not just something to be enjoined to 
defend the original work against substitution.234 This subtle 
shift is important because while the boundaries of a defensive 
derivative right can be ascertained vis-à-vis the defendant’s 
work on the plaintiff’s original market, the boundaries of an 
offensive derivative right can only be determined in the context 
of some other limiting principle.  
This extension of the derivative right from defensive to 
offensive may well have been inevitable. It seems likely that as 
more and more derivatives were enjoined defensively, courts 
and copyright owners began to see these derivatives as part of 
the authors’ inherent rights in their creations. In other words, 
once copyright owners were allowed to preclude derivatives to 
prevent competition with their original works, they quickly 
grew bold enough to assert an exclusive right in derivative 
works for their own sake—a development that, for good or ill, 
bridges the gap between premodern and modern copyright. 
  
 234 Just how far the pendulum had swung by the time of Folsom v. Marsh can 
be seen in the staunch criticism that George Ticknor Curtis leveled at the 
jurisprudence of the English courts in his 1847 treatise. Curtis’ rather extreme, almost 
hyperbolic, position was that the copyright owner’s rights covered “the whole book and 
every part of it . . . the style, or language, and expression; the learning, the facts, or the 
narrative; the sentiment and ideas, as far as their identity can be traced; and the form, 
arrangement and combination which the author has given to his materials.” GEORGE 
TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 273 (1847). 
